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Abstract
Models of adaptive bet-hedging commonly adopt insights from Kelly’s famous work on op-
timal gambling strategies and the financial value of information. In particular, such models
seek evolutionary solutions that maximize long term average growth rate of lineages, even
in the face of highly stochastic growth trajectories. Here, we argue for extensive departures
from the standard approach to better account for evolutionary contingencies. Crucially, we
incorporate considerations of volatility minimization, motivated by interim extinction risk in
finite populations, within a finite time horizon approach to growth maximization. We find
that a game-theoretic competitive-optimality approach best captures these additional con-
straints, and derive the equilibria solutions under straightforward fitness payoff functions and
extinction risks. We show that for both maximal growth and minimal time relative pay-
offs the log-optimal strategy is a unique pure-strategy symmetric equilibrium, invariant with
evolutionary time horizon and robust to low extinction risks.
Keywords: adaptive bet-hedging, Kelly gambling, growth optimal portfolio theory, game theory, finite time
horizon, extinction risk.
1. Introduction
‘‘Adversity has the effect of eliciting talents, which in prosperous circumstances
would have lain dormant.’’ -- Horace (65BC-8BC)
Kelly’s work on optimal gambling strategies and the value of side information was arguably the first
convincing attempt at applying concepts from information theory for analysis in a different field [Kelly,
1956]. This work was the precursor to growth-optimal portfolio theory which has extended the basic
ideas to the realm of capital markets ([Cover and Thomas, 2006]). There has recently been a resurge
of interest in employing insights from optimal gambling theory in models of adaptive bet-hedging under
fluctuating environments, where close analogies between the economic and biological setting have been
convincingly made apparent ([Bergstrom, 2014]; [Rivoire and Leibler, 2011]; [Donaldson-Matasci et al.,
2010]).
Biological bet hedging was originally proposed to explain the observation of un-germinated seeds
of annual plants ([Cohen, 1966]). This strategy involves the variable phenotypic expression of a single
genotype, rather than a result of genetic polymorphism, although it is difficult to empirically determine
whether observed phenotypic diversity in a population arises from randomization by identical genomes or
from an underlying polymorphism ([Seger and Brockmann, 1987]). Indeed, evolutionary biologists have
long acknowledged that in a stochastically variable environment, natural selection is likely to favor a
gene that randomizes its phenotypic expression ([Bergstrom, 2014]). Recent work has revealed a variety
of potential instances of bet hedging populations: delayed germination in desert winter annual plants
that meets postulated criteria of adaptive bet hedging in a variable environment ([Gremer and Venable,
2014]), bacterial persistence in the presence of antibiotics that appears to constitute an adaptation tuned
to the distribution of environmental change ([Kussell et al., 2005]), flowering times in Lobelia inflata
which point to flowering being a conservative bet-hedging strategy ([Simons and Johnston, 2003]), or
even bet-hedging as a behavioural phenotype, such as the case of nut hoarding in squirrel populations in
anticipation of short or long winters ([Bergstrom, 2014]).
Notwithstanding these empirical findings, identifying actual cases of adaptive bet hedging in the wild
remains elusive. As [Seger and Brockmann, 1987] have noted more than three decades ago, it is in general
difficult to determine whether observed diversity of behavior in a population arises from randomization
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by genetically identical individuals or from genetic heterogeneity within co-located individuals optimized
for different environmental conditions. Moreover, phenotypic heterogeneity can arise within genetically
homogenous populations as a form of specialization in a stable environment through stochastic gene
expression, positive feedback loops, or asymmetrical cell division, all processes where bet-hedging is not
at play ([Rubin and Doebeli, 2017]). These difficulties provide further impetus for constructing better
and more elaborate models to test against the data.
Of particular note in classic bet hedging models is the adoption from economic theory of asymptotic
growth rate optimality as the target function for fitness maximization strategies, where growth in wealth
is analogous to growth in lineage size. Indeed, since evolution proceeds by shifting gene frequencies
over generations, with frequency changes being multiplicative, long-term fitness is commonly measured
by geometric mean fitness across generations ([Hopper, 2018]). At the same time, it is also widely
acknowledged that long-run growth rate is not a valid measure of fitness under fluctuating environments,
such as in the case of bet-hedging populations ([Lande, 2007]).
The resulting intrinsic unpredictability has led some researchers to formulate a probabilistic perspec-
tive for natural selection that integrates various effects of uncertainty on natural selection ([Yoshimura
et al., 2009]). The applicability of geometric mean fitness has also come into question under finite
population models, where the probability of fixation provides additional and sometimes more suitable in-
formation than the geometric mean fitness ([Proulx and Day, 2001]), and in periodically cycling selection
regimes, where evolutionary success depends on the length of the cycle and the strength of selection ([Ram
et al., 2018]). Moreover, both gambling and bet-hedging models targeting optimal growth rate implicitly
assume an infinite time horizon in formulating the geometric average, and thereby ignore the finiteness
of actual horizons over which both economic and evolutionary processes ultimately act. The problem is
further amplified when interim extinction risk is taken into account, especially under finite population
models. Lineage growth trajectories which are highly stochastic are at risk of large ‘draw-downs’, which
may pull the population below some extinction threshold, despite possessing a high asymptotic growth
rate. Here we aim to incorporate considerations of finite evolutionary horizons and extinction risk in the
search for adaptive optimality in bet hedging models.
1.1 Background: The standard model
Most adaptive bet hedging models are largely based on the classic horse-race gambling model associated
with Kelly (1956), where the biological counter-part is a lineage apportioning bets on several possible
environments. Assume that k horses run in a race, and let horse Xi win with probability pi. If horse Xi
wins, the odds are oi for 1. A gambler wishes to apportion his bankroll among the horses 0 < fi ≤ 1,
such that
∑
fi = 1 and participate in indefinitely repeated races n → ∞. How to best apportion the
bankroll each time? In this setting, wealth is a discrete-time stochastic process over n periods,
Wn =
n∏
i=1
Wi(X)
where W (X) = f(X)O(X) is the random factor by which the gambler’s wealth is multiplied when horse
X wins. More explicitly,
Wn(f) =
k∏
i=1
(fioi)
Hi , where, H ∼Multinomial(n, k, [p1, ..., pk]).
Kelly first insight was that choosing to simply maximize expected wealth (for any time horizon n) gives
argmaxf E[Wn(f)] = 1, with the implication that one bets everything on a single horse (the one with the
highest pi) and a consequent chance of total ruin once that horse loses a race. Therefore, Kelly proposed
maximizing the asymptotic growth rate (the rigorous justification provided by [Breiman, 1961]). By the
law of large numbers random wealth may be expressed as,
Wn(f)
.
= 2nE[logW (X)]
where,
E[logW (X)] =
k∑
i=1
pi log fioi
is the asymptotic exponential growth rate. If the gambler stakes his entire wealth each time i.e.,
∑
fi = 1,
then
E[logW (X)] =
k∑
i=1
pi log oi −H(p)−D(p||f)
is maximized (convex nonlinear optimization) at “proportional gambling” f = p where D(p‖f) is mini-
mized, without regard the actual odds provided by the bookie.
Indeed, the notion of proportional gambling, made famous by Kelly’s treatment, has found its way into
classic models of diversified bet hedging. In such models often assumed that “appropriate phenotypes are
produced in proportion to the likelihood of each environment” ([Hopper, 2018]) and that consequently
“the classical bet-hedging prediction [is] that the optimum probability for employing a strategy is ap-
proximately equal to the probability that the strategy will be useful” ([King and Masel, 2007]). Here
we follow recent approaches that extend the standard model to non-lethal environments via a full fitness
matrix, such that this notion is no longer directly applicable.
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[Breiman, 1961] was first to show that the Kelly solution is optimal in two convincing ways: [a] that
given a Kelly strategy φ∗ and any other “essentially different” strategy φ (not necessarily a fixed fractional
betting strategy),
lim
n→∞
Wn(φ
∗)
Wn(φ)
=∞ a.s
and [b] that it minimizes the expected time to reach asymptotically large wealth goals. Moreover, this
strategy is myopic in the sense that at each iteration of the race one only needs to consider the presently
given parameters ([Hakansson, 1971]). However, Kelly strategies may also yield tremendous drawdowns,
a problem widely recognized in the gambling community, such that optimal Kelly is often viewed as
“too risky”; in practice gamblers and investors use ‘fractional Kelly’ which deviates from the optimal
solution but reduces the effective variance of the stochastic growth (Fig. 1). In the biological framework,
this can lead to abrupt extinction events in finite (especially small) populations with highly stochastic
lineage growth trajectories. A further complication is that the underlying probability distributions are
merely estimated from past data and model assumptions, leading often to over-betting and increased risk
([MacLean et al., 2011]).
Growth rate
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Fig. 1: The asymptotic exponential growth rate and its (finite-horizon) variance for either the two-horse racing
model or the classic bet-hedging model (two environments). Note that the strategy (f on the x-axis) that
maximizes the growth rate is far from the locus of minimal variance.
In this work, we extend the existing models to incorporate both interim extinction risk and finite
evolutionary time horizons within a bet hedging framework. This requires re-conceptualizing geometric-
mean fitness for such highly stochastic growth scenarios. We ultimately derive fitness functions that
better account for such conditions where the fluctuating environment is strongly coupled to both long
and short-term growth, and locate optimal stable equilibria.
2. Methods
2.1 The full-fitness matrix model
We assume environments are i.i.d random events across generations, multinomially distributed (with
some results generalized to non-identically distributed environments). Individuals within lineages have
a static full fitness matrix [Oij ] in which nonlethal environments have low but generally non-zero fitness
([Donaldson-Matasci et al., 2010]; [Rivoire and Leibler, 2011]). We adopt a finite-population model where
lineages start off with some initial population size W0, implicitly assumed higher than some bet-hedging
evolutionary threshold ([King and Masel, 2007]). Lineages then evolve strategies to randomize individual
phenotypes towards maximizing growth across finite horizons in the face of interim extinction threats.
More formally, with k environments and phenotypes,
[oij ] :=
t1 · · · tk( )e1 o11 · · · o1k
...
...
. . .
...
ek ok1 · · · okk
(1)
the general model of lineage growth trajectory across n generations under strategy f is a random process,
Wn =
k∏
i=1
( k∑
j=1
fjoij
)Hi
(2)
where,
H ∼Multinomial(n, k, [p1, . . . , pk])
with off-diagonal values reflecting the lower fitness for non-matching environments,
oii > oij ≥ 0 and oii > 1
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and where all individuals in a lineage are bet-hedging,
k∑
i=1
fi = 1.
And finally, using a straightforward formulation of the growth rate, W 1/nn , a random variable for any
finite horizon.
We first derive the asymptotic growth-rate optimal “Kelly” solution for this setting (fKelly) with a
corresponding bet-hedging region of the environment simplex (Appendix A). Relaxing the assumption of
i.i.d environments we derive the static Kelly solution for the case of nonstationary environments – where
environments are independent but not identically distributed across generations (Appendix B). While
under nonstationary environments an optimal growth rate is reached with a dynamic myopic strategy,
we focus here on a static strategy since adaptations effectively stabilize across time spans much higher
than single generations, such that from evolutionary considerations dynamic strategies are not likely to
emerge. Alternative models of fluctuating environments such as Markov chains with underlying switching
probabilities (e.g. [Li et al., 2017]) are not pursued here and left for future work. Finally, we identify
a ‘reference’ strategy that admits deterministic growth trajectories, namely the “Dutch book” solution
(where the variance of the finite-time growth rate is zero) and characterize the consequent loss of growth
incurred by exchanging opportunity for certainty (Appendix C).
2.2 Relative fitness payoff function
We now wish to go beyond the standard approach of targeting the optimization of the asymptotic growth
rate as undertaken in the previous section – to incorporate finite evolutionary horizons and extinction
risk considerations. For the sake of simplicity, we confine our model here to the case of k = 2 environ-
ments and phenotypes (so that the two environments occur with probability p and 1 − p). To motivate
the shift to a finite horizon framework we first highlight an important property of our stochastic growth
model, known also in portfolio theory ([Markowitz, 2006]). We prove that for any two essentially different
strategies, the maximal time n0 one lineage “dominates” the other is finite for every realization of lineage
trajectory pair (Appendix D). The exponentially diminishing histogram of last intersection times of given
two growth strategies in Fig. 2B (with a single instance of two trajectories for illustration in Fig. 2A)
demonstrates this phenomenon.
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Fig. 2: Two perspectives on growth trajectories Wn and their last ‘intersection’ point for two lineages with differ-
ent strategies (a log-optimal Kelly and a suboptimal ‘fractional Kelly’). A: The optimal Kelly strategy eventually
departs from a suboptimal strategy without further intersections, ‘the last intersection’. | B: A histogram demon-
strating that the last intersection of the trajectories of any two growth strategies occurs at some finite time (here,
somewhat above 500 generations).
The sustained variance and high skewness of the growth rate distribution under any finite horizon
necessitates a comparative approach in formulating a fitness payoff function (in fact, the growth rate is
asymptotically log-normal as shown in Appendix E). Consider a relative fitness measure for two different
lineage strategies f and g: the probability that a random trajectory of a lineage with strategy f exceeds
the random trajectory of a lineage with strategy g (given time horizon n),
h(f, g) = P (Wn(f) > Wn(g)) (3)
with an induced relation defined by,
Wn(f) ≥Wn(g) : P (Wn(f) > Wn(g)) ≥ P (Wn(f) < Wn(g)). (4)
We may interpret this probabilistic relation between two strategies as relative fitness. Note that since
realizations of Wn(f) and Wn(g) stem from the same underlying stochastic environmental sequence, they
will generally be highly correlated (with the corresponding logarithmic growth rates in fact perfectly
correlated, as shown in appendix F). Consequently, the probability in Eq. (3) must be derived from their
joint distribution rather than simply from marginal distributions. Fig. 3 depicts realizations of the log
4
growth rates of Wn(f) and Wn(g) as histogram distributions for some choice of strategies f and g, and
some finite evolutionary horizon n. Asymptotically with time horizon n, such distributions approach
normality with variance going to zero (Appendix E).
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Fig. 3: The distributions of log growth rates for two competing strategies here illustrated as histograms (the
x-axis is the log growth rate). In this simple case shown, the strategy generating the higher growth-rates right
distribution (blue) is evidently of higher fitness than the one generating the left distribution (green). For clarity,
only the marginal distributions are shown (the complete picture is in the joint distribution, due to the correlation
between any two growth trajectories that share the same fluctuating environment regime).
A few properties of the order induced by this relation are worth highlighting. [a] it is a complete order
since any two Wn are comparable under the relation, [b] it is transitive for any n and consequently a
pre-order, and [c] its maximal element is W ∗n(fKelly), such that both the order induced by E[logWn(f)]
and the order induced by the payoff P (Wn(f) > Wn(g)) form complete preorders and have the same
maximal element (Appendix G). Despite these beneficial properties, given any ‘vanilla’ strategy g and
time horizon n, the strategy that maximizes the payoff function,
argmax
f
P (Wn(f) > Wn(g))
will vary as a function of g and n (demonstrated by counterexamples), and in particular will not necessarily
be fKelly. This implies that a wildtype lineage with strategy g different from fKelly will eventually be
overtaken by some mutant invasive lineage with a strategy that maximizes this payoff function, a process
that may potentially remain in recurrent flux, with invasive lineages replacing a wildtype lineage.
2.3 Competitive optimality with risk
To see whether evolutionary stable optima may also emerge we develop a game-theoretic approach.
Players are lineages with particular bet-hedging strategies and random initial population size. Lineages
interact by competing over a common niche subject to the same environmental fluctuations. This set-up is
in some contrast to more standard evolutionary game theory settings, where agents are organisms rather
than lineages and where the notion of an iterated strategy is prominent, but maintains the central aspect
of interactions formalized in a payoff function (e.g., [Stollmeier and Nagler, 2018]). A lineage survives
the competitive encounter by avoiding extinction (defined in what follows) while exceeding its opponent
in size over a given time horizon. This outcome is determined by a game-theoretic deterministic payoff
function, modified from Eq. (3) to incorporate an extinction threshold and randomized initial lineage
size. Ultimately, we are searching for Nash equilibria.
This approach is motivated by the classic work on time-invariant game-theoretic competitive optimal-
ity, within the scope of growth-optimal portfolio theory ([Bell and Cover, 1980, Bell and Cover, 1988]).
Bell and Cover consider a competitive setting for a stock portfolio model under any finite number of
investment periods and prove that for any relative wealth payoff E[φ(UW1/VW2)] and portfolio wealth
W1 and W2, there are conditions on the function φ such that the log-optimal Kelly portfolio is a solution
to the game, given initial randomizations U and V (independent and of equal expectation). In particular,
φ(x) = χ[1,∞)(x) results in the payoff P(UW1 ≤ VW2) with the log-optimal portfolio as a game-theoretic
solution, given some initial fair randomizations. This additional fair randomization reduces the effect of
small differences in end wealth, thus avoiding unwanted cases where the optimal strategy is beat by a
small amount most of the time ([Cover and Thomas, 2006]).
2.4 The payoff function in a game-theoretic setting
For any time-horizon n and extinction threshold d, we define a (deterministic) payoff function: the
probability that a random trajectory of a lineage with strategy f exceeds the random trajectory of a
lineage with strategy g without first going extinct (given time horizon n),
Mn(f, g) = P (u0Wn(f) > v0Wn(g)| extinction level d) :=
P (u0Wn(f) > v0Wn(g) ∧Wi, Vi > d, i : 1, . . . , n)+
P (u0Wn(f) > d, i : 1, . . . , n ∧ v0Wi(f) ≤ d some i)
(5)
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with initial population size independent randomizations u0 and v0, independent and of same mean but
possibly of a different distribution class.
This payoff function induces a symmetric discrete-valued non constant-sum game setting, although
it is conceptually “zero-sum” Mn(f, g) + Mn(g, f) < 1 (Appendix H). Crucially, our payoff matrix is
finite since it reflects the finitely many strategies possible in a finite population model – there can only
be N different sized partitions of a population of size N in betting on two environments (under k = 2
environments and phenotypes). A low-resolution toy-model instance of the payoff matrix is depicted in
Fig. 4.
Fig. 4: An example of a (2 × 2 strategies) evolutionary payoff matrix for a game of two lineages, with primary
lineage payoff in bold.
Our goal would be to identify pure strategy Nash equilibria reflecting the evolutionary solutions to
competitive bet-hedging. In particular, we would like to explore the conditions under which a bet-hedging
setting admits a symmetric equilibrium and whether it is unique. In Appendix I we prove that for an
infinite-size payoff matrix (i.e., continuous strategies) the log-optimal strategy is the solution to this
game, invariant with the choice of time horizon. Moreover, any finite matrix representing the N strate-
gies possible for a lineage of finite size N necessarily also admits a solution, as illustrated in Fig. 5. This
solution is the strategy closest to the log-optimal strategy under the finite resolution framework, such
that it converges to it asymptotically with N (Appendix L). Finally, under a nonstationary environment
model the log-optimal strategy again emerges as the equilibrium static strategy – even given short time
horizons (Appendix M).
A B C D
Fig. 5: An example of payoff matrix simulations (figs. A and C: darker cells represent higher probabilities) and
the resulting Nash equilibria in the maximal element matrices (figs. B and D: blue cells for column-maximal
primary player payoffs, red for row-maximal opponent payoffs and yellow for symmetric Nash equilibria). Only
portions of the matrices around the equilibrium are shown. A+B: Low resolution matrices corresponding to a small
population with limited strategies | C+D: Higher resolution matrices, which correspond to a larger population
and subsequently higher number of strategies (multiple maxima in some adjacent cells of panel D is an effect due
to a combination of using finite runs in the simulation of the payoff function, such that computed probabilities
are rational values, along with high resolution in the range of strategies). The model uses a 2× 2 fitness matrix:
[o11 = 3.0; o12 = 0.2; o22 = 1.8; o21 = 0.1] with p = 0.594 and a resulting log-optimal strategy f = 0.60).
The effect of lineage-size extinction thresholds on actual rates of extinction of random growth tra-
jectories is illustrated in Fig. 6A. As would be expected, higher thresholds of extinction correspond
to higher probabilities of extinction, with extinction rates that converge quickly to asymptotic values
(Appendix N). Numerical simulations indicate that when incorporating low extinction thresholds that
result in low extinction rates, the symmetric Nash equilibrium remains stable at the log-optimal strategy.
Higher thresholds may result in a number of scenarios: a shift of the symmetric equilibrium away from
the log-optimal solution, complete lack of equilibrium solution, or the emergence of multiple symmetric
equilibria; in conjunction, multiple pairs of off-diagonal equilibria may appear (see Fig. 6B for one such
scenario).
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Fig. 6: A: The accumulative probability of extinction for log-optimal (Kelly) strategies for different lineage-size
extinction thresholds. | B: An instance of the maximal element matrix of a payoff matrix (a portion around the
solutions) resulting from introducing an extinction threshold: two off-diagonal Nash equilibria (black) along with
a symmetric Nash equilibrium shifted from the log-optimal strategy (yellow). The simulations use a 2× 2 fitness
matrix: [o11 = 2.5; o12 = 0.2; o22 = 1.4; o21 = 0.1] with p = 0.75, and with n = 60 in the simulation of panel B.
2.5 Minimum time to reach a population threshold size
To gain further perspective on optimal strategies under highly stochastic growth we consider evolutionary
competition between lineages, where survival is determined by reaching a certain threshold of lineage size
in minimal time (e.g. for K−selected species, see [Reznick et al., 2002]). In effect, the lineage with growth
characteristics that minimize the time to reach a certain population size threshold “wins”, a setting with
potential relevance in the context of competitively colonizing a limited niche, as in range expansion sce-
narios (see [Villa-Martin et al., 2019] for a bet-hedging population expanding into an unoccupied space).
We follow the classic results of [Breiman, 1961] on the log-optimal portfolio as the optimal strategy
minimizing the expected time to reach an asymptotic target wealth, but instead of an infinite target we
base the fitness payoff function on finite targets. Initial insight into the effect of strategy choice on the
consequent distributions of minimal time (Fig. 7A) is provided by comparing their expectation, where
the optimality of Kelly is already apparent (Fig. 7B).
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Fig. 7: A: An example of the marginal distributions of the minimal time to reach a certain population size
threshold, for two strategies | B: A simulation of (E[T (g, c)]− E[T (f∗, c)]) for several target values c, under the
range of vanilla strategies g corresponding to positive asymptotic growth rates, where f∗ = 0.8.
Instead of considering expectations of (highly correlated) minimal time distributions, we devise a more
informative fitness payoff function based on the joint distribution. Crucially, this payoff will naturally
be amenable to a game-theoretic approach, in line with the type of analysis in the previous section with
payoff Mn(f, g). As before, we condition the probability on avoiding an extinction threshold. The payoff
captures the probability that a trajectory following strategy f reaches threshold c before a trajectory
following strategy g, conditioned on avoiding an extinction threshold d. If both trajectories reach c at
the same time (since time is in discrete generations) then the one which overshoots with a greater margin
above c ‘wins’. Denote by T (f, c) the minimal time distribution given strategy f and target lineage size
c,
Mc(f, g) = P (T (f, c) < T (g, c)| extinction level d).
More precisely, we denote new trajectories {WEk }nk=1 by
WE0 ∈ U [a, b],
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and for all k = 0, . . . , n− 1
WEk+1 =
{
WEk o1(f)
xk+1o2(f)
1−xk+1 , if WEk ≥ E
0, if WEk < E.
We denote also by
T (f, c) := min{n :WEn (f) ≥ c}
the first time when the trajectory {WEk }nk=0 cut the threshold c. T (f, C) =∞ if and only if this trajectory
does not cut the threshold.
Then the payoff matrix Mc(f, g) is defined by
Mc(f, g) := P(T (f, C) < T (g, C)|given that at least one of them is finite)
+ P(T (f, C) = T (g, C),WET (f,C) > V
E
T (g,C)|given that at least one of them is finite).
(6)
We then identify pure strategy Nash equilibria reflecting the evolutionary solutions with the new
relative payoff Mc(f, g). In Appendix J we prove that again Kelly is the solution to the game, invariant
to the evolutionary ‘choice’ of target population size c, and that under a nonstationary environment
regime Kelly emerges as the static equilibrium strategy. Finally, we highlight a deep mathematical
link of this probabilistic perspective for minimal time optimality to the competitive optimality setting
with payoff Mn(f, g). Formally, Mc(f, g) can be rewritten as a convex linear combination of Mn(f, g):
Mc(f, g) =
∑∞
n=0 P (W0Wn(f) > V0Wn(g), T (f, c) = n) (see Appendix J for more details).
3. Discussion
In this work we provide further support for the robustness of the expected log criterion as an optimality
solution for biological bet hedging. We develop a game-theoretic framework inherently invariant to
the span of evolutionary horizons while incorporating considerations of interim extinction risk, and use
multiple optimality criteria to strengthen our results. This approach goes beyond standard models of
bet-hedging, which focus on indefinite ‘long-term’ growth rates and that ignore accounting for interim
risk. Previous work generally upholds that “phenotypes with the greatest long-term average growth rate
will dominate the entire population” as “the basic principle” used in optimization ([Yoshimura and Jansen,
1996]), or that a proxy for the likely outcome of evolution is “to think of organisms as maximizing the
long-term growth rate of their lineage” ([Donaldson-Matasci et al., 2010]).
Nevertheless, some authors have recently acknowledged the importance of accounting for finite time
horizons. For instance, [Rivoire and Leibler, 2011] note in passing that in their model “the growth rate
emerges as a unique measure of fitness when considering the long-term limit T →∞, but, if considering
a finite “horizon”, there may be a different strategy that outperforms [it]”. Indeed, as some evolutionists
have argued, short-term fitness measures are also needed to achieve a full understanding of how evolution
works in variable environments, as geometric mean fitness concerns the long-run evolutionary outcome
([Okasha, 2018]). Moreover, long-term fitness metrics are typically formulated without regard to transient
short-term population dynamics, in which lineages might come close to extinction. Under more inclusive
models with extinction, selection in a fluctuating environment can also favor bet-hedging strategies that
ultimately increase the risk of extinction ([Libby and Ratcliff, 2019]). Given such considerations, the
benefit of explicitly incorporating extinction considerations in stochastic growth models is clearly evident.
We have opted to focus on symmetric Nash equilibria rather than evolutionary stable strategies (ESS),
which are strategies that cannot be beaten if the fraction of the rival invading mutants in the population
is sufficiently small, and are generally invoked in settings with iterative match-ups between individuals
rather than lineages ([Smith and Price, 1973]). Since the payoff in our game theoretic setting pits one
lineage against another (two different strategies) there is no explicit sense of invading mutants (but
see [Olofsson et al., 2009] for an ESS approach to bet-hedging). Moreover, some of the classic aspects
of Nash’s theorem do not directly apply within our setting. The theorem states that for every two-
person zero-sum game with finitely many strategies there exists a mixed strategy that solves the game
([Nash, 1951]). While our framework is indeed “two-person” it is not zero-sum and has finitely many
strategies. Crucially, since an implicit goal of theoretical work such as ours may be towards predicting
which strategies are likely to evolve, we focus on pure strategies rather than mixed ones, where the
uniqueness of the equilibrium solution emerges as especially beneficial (echoing the classic approach of
growth rate log-optimality where there is always a unique solution due to convexity).
We are not the first to attempt to model the expected minimal time to reach a finite asymptotic
target, an extension of the seminal result of [Breiman, 1961] on properties of the log optimal portfolio.
[Aucamp, 1977]) derived the first such analysis, given some basic assumptions that concern reaching a
wealth target exactly vs. “overshooting” it. More recently, [Kardaras and Platen, 2010] find that in a
continuous time or asset price model where a finite target can be exactly reached with no overshooting,
the Kelly solution is still optimal; in a discrete time model Kelly is only approximately optimal, but
if “time rebates” are introduced (to compensate overshooting the goal in the last investment period) it
becomes exactly optimal. While these results on the expectation of the time distribution are in line
with our analysis of stochastic lineage growth optimality, we obtain an even stronger result: given finite
population size targets, the log-optimal strategy emerges as a Nash equilibrium under a payoff function
based on the joint distribution of minimal time trajectories.
Interestingly, [Kelly, 1956] has anticipated the application of his ideas in biological bet hedging, writing
“Although the model adopted here is drawn from the real-life situation of gambling it is possible that
it could apply to certain other economic situations. . . the essential requirements for the validity of the
theory are the possibility of reinvestment of profits and the ability to control or vary the amount of money
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invested or bet in different categories.” It does not require a leap of the imagination to notice analogies
of “economic situations” to evolutionary strategies, of “reinvestment of profits” to biological reproduction
and growth, and of the “control” of invested money to evolved adaptative optimality. Of course, it best
appreciated with Shannon’s famous “bandwagon” warning in mind, cautioning over hasty attempts to
apply insights from information theory to other fields ([Shannon, 1956]).
3.1 Other approaches to optimization under finite horizon and risk
A seemingly straightforward way of introducing finite (albeit still arbitrary) horizons into optimization
settings is by considering the expectation of a finite-horizon growth rate. This is the approach adopted
in some recent stock portfolio models for finite horizons ([Vince and Zhu, 2013]; [Morgan, 2015]). Within
our formalism from Eq. (2), this amounts to finding,
argmax
f
E
[
Wn(f)
1
n
]
= argmax
f
(
k∑
i=1
( k∑
j=1
fjoij
) 1
n
pi
)n
.
However, this implicitly assumes some arbitrary utility function, in this case the n-th root, the maxi-
mization of which requiring some justification. In contrast, Kelly’s focus on argmaxf E[logWn] while
implicitly assumes logarithmic utility, is equivalent the limit of the above expression, and leads to desired
optimality properties as famously laid out by [Breiman, 1961].
A more convincing approach to maximizing wealth with risk management over finite horizons was
proposed in [Rujeerapaiboon et al., 2015] for portfolio construction. The authors consider the optimization
of a minimum bound for finite-horizon growth,
argmax
f
{
argmax
c
P
( 1
n
logWn ≥ c
)
≥ 1− ε
}
with a degree of freedom corresponding roughly to a risk-aversion or a choice of certainty parameter.
The expression above allows deriving the portfolio giving the highest minimum bound for wealth
for any level of certainty ε. While choosing a particular horizon n and a risk-aversion parameter is
perfectly sensible in an investment setting, the translation to the biological framework is problematic:
what would be evolution’s risk aversion in this setting? Or the appropriate time horizon for optimization?
Any choice of these two parameters would inescapably be arbitrary in nature. In an alternative approach
[Rujeerapaiboon et al., 2018] reformulate the Kelly gambling setting in terms of the Conservative Expected
Value (CEV), a risk-averse expectation for highly skewed distributions. This amounts essentially to
devising a systematic way of constructing fractional Kelly strategies such that it is strongly coupled with
the infimum of the finite-horizon growth rate. Here again, there is an implicit arbitrariness in the choice
of horizon length if applied in the context of an evolutionary framework, which we seek to avoid.
Other authors have focused on incorporating risk to the standard Kelly gambling setting with an
infinite time horizon. For instance, [Busseti et al., 2016] develop a systematic way to trade off growth
rate and drawdown risk by formulating a risk-constrained Kelly gambling problem within the standard
setting of growth rate maximization under asymptotic horizons. The additional risk constraint limits
the probability of a drawdown to a specified level. Nevertheless, for our purposes, percentage drawdown
is arguably not a natural metric for representing lineage extinction risks, as compared with explicit
extinction thresholds, especially in scenarios of competing finite-size populations ([Ashby et al., 2017]).
Still other approaches may seek to target risk minimization as a primary criterion. In an approach akin
to our Dutch book analysis, [Wolf et al., 2005] minimize the growth rate variance and consequently the
probability of extinction due to ‘unlucky’ environmental trajectories. However, this is at the inevitable
expense of achieving high stochastic growth rates, a vital aspect of evolutionary fitness.
3.2 Game-theoretic competitive optimality of Bell and Cover
The results presented here can also be seen as both a special case and an extension of the classic results of
[Bell and Cover, 1980, Bell and Cover, 1988]. There are several important distinctions: [a] their setting is
formulated for continuous random variables whereas our environments are discrete events, [b] their payoff
implies a zero-sum game whereas our game is non zero-sum (more accurately, non-constant-sum) due to
the effect of extinctions, and [c] their payoff function is a straightforward probability while our payoff
is effectively a conditional probability (includes considerations of extinction risk). Moreover, implicit in
Bell and Cover’s setting is an infinitely sized payoff matrix, whereas our payoff matrix is finite since it
reflects a finite number of strategies possible in a finite population. These distinctions have enabled us to
show that, at least given the particular payoff function and discrete framework, the emerging symmetric
Nash equilibrium is in fact a strict and unique one.
Some authors have generalized or utilized other aspects of the classic competitive optimality results.
Most recently, [Garivaltis, 2018] has shown that discrete-time results of [Bell and Cover, 1988] hold equally
well for continuous-time rebalanced portfolios in a competitive setting between two investors, each aiming
to maximize the expected ratio of one’s own wealth to the other. In an original use of evolutionary ideas
in finance, [Lo et al., 2017] and [Orr, 2017] consider a payoff function capturing relative wealth of two
competing investors each with some set initial wealth, focusing on finite-period analysis. They analyze
optimal strategies of a primary player against a given ‘vanilla’ strategy, a framework consistent with our
initial relative payoff non-game-theoretic setting. They find that the particular vanilla strategy chosen
plays an important role in the optimal allocation, in conjunction with initial wealth of both players.
Finally, our game-theoretic analysis may hint at a solution to a “coincidence” pointed out in [Bell and
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Cover, 1980]. They were left perplexed as to why competitive optimality for a finite horizon turned out,
by “coincidence”, to have the same solution (namely, Kelly) as in the growth-optimal portfolio: “Finally,
it is tantalizing that b∗ arises as the solution to such dissimilar problems [. . . ] The underlying for this
coincidence will be investigated”. Their follow-up 1988 paper suggests a “possible reason for the robustness
of log optimal portfolios” or why “log optimal portfolios behave well in the competitive investment game”:
namely that the wealth generated from any portfolio is always within “fair reach” of the wealth from the
log-optimal portfolio. Indeed, the Kuhn-Tucker conditions and the consequent bound on the wealth ratio
([Cover and Thomas, 2006, Theorem 16.2.2]) already imply that game-theoretic optimality is the driving
force behind the asymptotic dominance. Fair randomization of initial wealth then leads to the game-
theoretic solution for any increasing function of the wealth ratio. Our investigation of the payoff matrix
suggests another perspective to this “coincidence”. Asymptotically with horizon n, the payoff matrix
becomes maximally ‘contrasted’, with off-diagonal cells converging to probabilities of 0 or 1 (except
those on ‘fault lines’), such that the Nash equilibrium emerges naturally. In effect, the ‘saddle-point’
equilibrium, which has been established as invariant with n, asymptotically attains maximum curvature
(Appendix K).
4. Conclusion
In this work we have argued that under fluctuating environments and trait randomization geometric
mean fitness should also encompass considerations of stochastic growth and extinction risk under finite
evolutionary horizons. We show that for both the relative maximal growth payoff and the relative
minimal time payoff there is a unique pure-strategy symmetric equilibrium, which is invariant with
evolutionary time horizon and robust to low extinction risk. Coinciding with the classic bet-hedging
modeling approach, this is the Kelly log-optimal strategy. With higher thresholds of extinction, the
equilibrium may shift away from Kelly and possibly branch out to multiple equilibria. Future work will
be required to generalize the model to competitive optimality payoffs beyond pairwise lineages, Markovian
environmental sequential transitions, random fitness matrices, and to more precisely capture the effect
of high extinction thresholds on the optimal evolutionary solutions.
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Appendix A The Kelly solution to the full fitness matrix model
In this section, we derive the Kelly (log optimal) solution for the full-fitness matrix model.
The case k = 2: We have
Wn(f) = (o11f + o12(1− f))H(o21f + o22(1− f))n−H
where H ∼ Binomial(n, p). The Kelly solution is then defined by
fKelly := arg max
f∈[0,1]
G(f)
where G(f) := limn→∞W
1
n
n (f).
By denoting o1(f) := o11f + o12(1− f), o2(f) := o21f + o22(1− f), we have
lim
n→∞
1
n
logWn(f) = lim
n→∞
(
H
n
log o1(f) + (1− H
n
) log o2(f)
)
= p log o1(f) + (1− p) log o2(f).
Therefore, by directed calculations, we obtain the Kelly solution which is dependent on p
fKelly(p) =

0, if p ∈ [0, p−]
(1−p)o12
o12−o11 +
po22
o22−o21 , if p ∈ [p−, p+]
1, if p ∈ [p+, 1],
where p− = o12(o22−o21)∆ and p+ =
o11(o22−o21)
∆
, and the corresponding optimal value is
G(fKelly) =

op12o
1−p
22 , if p ∈ [0, p−](
p(o11o22−o12o21)
o22−o21
)p(
(1−p)(o11o22−o12o21)
o11−o12
)1−p
, if p ∈ [p−, p+]
op11o
1−p
21 , if p ∈ [p+, 1].
The case general k: By directed calculations, we obtain
G(f) =
k∏
i=1
oi(f)
pi
where oi(f) :=
∑k
j=1 oijfj . This implies that for each p ∈ ∆k−1 := {(x1, . . . , xk) ∈ [0, 1]k such that x1+· · ·+xk =
1}, G(f) is a continuous strict convex function in the compact convex domain ∆k−1. Therefore there will always
exist a unique Kelly solution fKelly ∈ ∆k−1 which is dependent on p.
Remark:
(i) If the fitness matrix is diagonal, i.e., (oij) = diag{o1, . . . , ok}, then (fKelly)i = pi;
(ii) fKelly solves the system
k∑
i=1
pioij
oi(f)
= 1, ∀j = 1, . . . , k.
Appendix B The solution to nonstationary environments
We model the environment probabilities on a parameterized Beta distribution, such that p ∼ B(α, β), and prove
that the Kelly solution (a static f that maximizes the asymptotic growth rate) in the asymptotic framework
corresponds to the solution of the i.i.d. environment case with a probability equaling the expectation of the Beta
distribution.
For sake of simplicity, we consider only k = 2. We haveWn(f) = o1(f)Ho2(f)n−H , whereH ∼ GB
(
n, {p1, . . . , pn} ∼
Beta(α, β)
)
, i.e., H = ε1 + · · ·+εn with εr ∼ Bernoulli(pr) and pr ∼ Beta(α, β). Using the law of large numbers,
we have
G(f) = lim
n→∞
(∑n
i=1 εi
n
log o1(f) +
(
1−
∑n
i=1 εi
n
)
log o2(f)
)
= lim
n→∞
(∑n
i=1 Eεi
n
log o1(f) +
(
1−
∑n
i=1 Eεi
n
)
log o2(f)
)
= lim
n→∞
(( 1
n
n∑
r=1
pr
)
log o1(f) +
(
1− 1
n
n∑
r=1
pr
)
log o2(f)
)
= p log o1(f) + (1− p) log o2(f) a.s.
where p = limn→∞ 1n
∑n
r=1 pr =
α
α+β
is the expectation of the Beta distribution. Thus, the Kelly solution in this
case is the same as the previous case.
Appendix C The Dutch book solution and the corresponding loss
of growth
In this section we derive the Dutch book solution for our model. By definition, the Dutch book solution fD
satisfies o1(f) = o2(f) = · · · = ok(f) with the positive growth, i.e., o1(f) > 1.
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The case k = 2: The Dutch book solution satisfies
o11f + o12(1− f) = o21f + o22(1− f) > 1.
Therefore, if ∆ := o11o22 − o12o21 > o11 + o22 − o12 − o21 then we always have a unique Dutch book solution fD
fD =
o22 − o12
o22 − o12 + o11 − o21
and
G(fD) =
∆
o22 − o12 + o11 − o21 > 1 (which does not depend on p).
The general case k: We give out here some criteria to have a unique Dutch book solution in the general case k.
Lemma 1. Given a fitness matrix O = (oi,j)ki,j=1. Denote by αi,j = oi,j − ok,j for all j = 1, . . . , k and i =
1, . . . , k − 1. Denote by Λ = (Λi,j)ki,j=1 such that
α1,1 · · · α1,k−1 α1,k
...
. . .
...
...
αk−1,1 · · · αk−1,k−1 αk−1,k
1 · · · 1 1

Λ1,1 · · · Λ1,k... . . . ...
Λk,1 · · · Λk,k
 = Ik.
If this fitness matrix O satisfies
(i) oii > oji ≥ 0 for all i, j = 1, . . . , k
(ii) Λi,k > 0 for all i = 1, . . . , k
(iii)
k∑
j=1
oi,jΛj,k > 1 for all i = 1, . . . , k − 1
then there exists a Dutch book solution defined by fDj = Λj,k, j = 1, . . . , k and the corresponding deterministic
wealth is
G(fD) =
k∏
i=1
( k∑
j=1
oi,jf
D
j
)pi
=
k∑
j=1
oi,jΛj,k.
Proof. We have from Condition (iii)
o1(f
D) =
k∑
j=1
o1,jf
D
j =
k∑
j=1
o1,jΛj,k > 1;
Moreover from the definition of α and Λ we have oi(fD) = oj(fD) for all i 6= j = 1 . . . , k.
Corollary 1. In the case of a diagonal matrix, i.e., oi,j = diag{o1, . . . , ok}, by direct calculation, we obtain
Λi,k =
o−1i
k∑
j=1
o−1j
.
Conditions (i) and (ii) hold true iff oi > 0 and condition (iii) holds true iff
k∑
j=1
o−1j < 1.
Corollary 2. For a finite n and assuming min{oii}ki=1  max{oij}i 6=j ≥ 0, there exists a Dutch book solution
fD.
Proof. The conclusion directly follows from the above Corollary 1 (for a diagonal fitness matrix).
Appendix D Finite last intersection
In this section, we show that for a given pair of strategies (f, g) with G(f) > G(g), there is a T (f, g) < ∞ such
that Wn(f,x) > Wn(g,x) for all n ≥ T (f, g) and for all x ∈ {0, 1}∞. This means that the last intersection
between two random trajectories {Wn(f,x)}n and {Wn(g,x)}n
τ(x) := sup{n : Wn(f,x) ≤Wn(g,x)}
is bounded above by T (f, g) (a finite number depending only on f and g).
Proof. We first define the excess growth rate
En(x) :=
1
n
logWn(f,x)− 1
n
logWn(g,x).
We note that for all x
lim
n→∞
En(x) = logG(f)− logG(g) > 0. (7)
To this end we need to prove that there is a T (f, g) <∞ such that
inf
x
En(x) > 0 ∀n ≥ T (f, g).
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Otherwise, for each k there exist nk ≥ k and xk ∈ {0, 1}∞ such that Enk (xk) ≤ 0. Now, there exists a subsequence
of {xk} which is convergent to some x ∈ {0, 1}∞. Therefore as k →∞ we have nk →∞ and limnk→∞Enk (x) ≤ 0,
in contradiction to (7).
Appendix E Asymptotic log-normality of the growth rate
In this section, we show that in our discrete model, the growth rate approaches log-normality with zero variance.
Proof. We rewrite 1
n
logWn(f) =
1
n
∑n
i=1 yi, where yi = xi log o1(f) + (1− xi) log o2(f) are independent discrete
random variables with values: log o1(f), log o2(f) and probabilities: p, 1 − p correspondingly. Thus we have a
sequence of i.i.d. random variables {yi}i with expectation µ = E(yi) = G(f) and variance σ2 = var(yi) =
p(1− p)(log o1(f)− log o2(f))2. By using the CLT, we have for a large n: 1/√n∑ni=1(yi − µ) ∼ N(0, σ2) which
is equivalent to
1
n
n∑
i=1
yi ∼ N(µ, σ
2
n
).
Appendix F Fully correlated log growth rates for the case k=2:
In this section we show that for all f, g 6= fD
Cor[logWn(f), logWn(g)] = ±1.
Proof. Denote by
Wn(f,x) = o1(f)
|x|o2(f)
n−|x|,
where x = (x1, . . . , xn) is a realization and |x| = x1 + · · · + xn. Because f, g 6= fD we have o1(f) 6= o2(f) and
o1(g) 6= o2(g), therefore we can define
λ =
log o1(f)
o2(f)
log o1(g)
o2(g)
∈ R \ {0}.
We first prove that for any given m realizations x(1), . . . ,x(m), we have
logWn(f,x
(i))− 1
m
m∑
k=1
logWn(f,x
(k)) = λ
(
logWn(g,x
(i))− 1
m
m∑
k=1
logWn(g,x
(k))
)
. (8)
Indeed, we note that
logWn(f,x
(i))− logWn(f,x(j)) = log o1(f)
|x(i)|o2(f)n−|x
(i)|
o1(f)|x
(j)|o2(f)n−|x
(j)| = (|x
(i)| − |x(j)|) log o1(f)
o2(f)
,
and similarly for g. This implies (8). Therefore
Cor[logWn(f), logWn(g)] =
Cov[logWn(f), logWn(g)]√
Var[logWn(f)]
√
Var[logWn(g)]
=
1
m
m∑
i=1
(logWn(f,x
(i))− E[logWn(f)])(logWn(g,x(i))− E[logWn(g)])√√√√ 1
m
m∑
i=1
(
logWn(f,x(i))− E[logWn(f)]
)2√√√√ 1
m
m∑
i=1
(
logWn(g,x(i))− E[logWn(g)])
)2 = λ|λ| = ±1.
Remark 1. Whether the correlation is ±1 depends on λ > 0 or λ < 0. For f = fKelly the growth factor
with environment “1” > the growth factor with environment “0” implying log o1(f)
o2(f)
> 0. Similarly for g it implies
log o1(g)
o2(g)
> 0, therefore λ > 0. At fD, log o1(f
D)
o2(fD)
= 0, therefore it acts as a threshold. In most cases the correlation
will be +1 since both f and g induce a positive growth rate.
Appendix G Kelly is the maximal element in the fitness payoff
relation
Here we assume lineage size initial randomization, i.e., Wn(f)Wn(g) iff
Mn(f, g) := P(W0Wn(f) > V0Wn(g)) ≥ P(V0Wn(g) > W0Wn(f))
where W0 and V0 are random, and show that the Kelly strategy is the maximal element in this relation.
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Proof. As a direct consequence of Proposition 1 and Eq. (11) we have
Mn(f
Kelly, f) ≥ 1/2 ≥Mn(f, fKelly) ∀f ∈ [0, 1],
and equality if and only if f = fKelly.
Appendix H Non-constant-sum game, but conceptually zero-sum
In this section we show that
Proposition 1. (i) For d = 0, Mn(f, g) +Mn(g, f) = 1 for all f, g.
(ii) For d > 0, Mn(f, g) +Mn(g, f) < 1 for all f, g.
Moreover, the game is conceptually zero-sum, but not formally.
Proof. (i) We have from Eq. (9)
Mn(f, g) +Mn(g, f) =
n∑
s=0
(
P(Wn(f, s)W0 > Wn(g, s)V0) + P(Wn(f, s)W0 < Wn(g, s)V0)
)
P (s) =
n∑
s=0
P (s) = 1.
(ii) On the other hand, we have from Eq. (5) for all f 6= g
Mn(f, g) +Mn(g, f) = P(CAB) + P(ABc) + P(CcAB) + P(BAc) = P(AB) + P(ABc) + P(BAc) = P(A ∪B) < 1.
where C = {W0Wn(f) > V0Wn(g)}, A = {W0Wi(f) > d ∀i = 1, . . . , n}, B = {V0Wi(g) > d ∀i = 1, . . . , n}.
For f = g we also have
Mn(f, f) = P(W0 > V0, A1, A2) < P(W0 > V0) =
1
2
.
where A1 = {W0Wi(f) > d ∀i = 1, . . . , n}, A2 = {V0Wi(f) > d ∀i = 1, . . . , n}.
Finally, numeric simulations demonstrate that if M(W,V ) > M(U, V ) then M(V,W ) < M(V,U) for all W,V,U ,
i.e. changing to a strategy with a gain for one player always incurs a loss for the other player.
Appendix I The symmetric Nash equilibrium solution to payoff
Mn(f, g)
Proposition 2. We always have
E
(
Wn(f)
Wn(fKelly)
)
≤ 1
and the equality happens if and only if p− < p < p+.
Proof. For given f, g, we denote by α1 = o1(f)o1(g) , α2 =
o2(f)
o2(g)
. We have
E
(
Wn(f)
Wn(g)
)
=
∑
x
Wn(f,x)
Wn(g,x)
P (x) =
n∑
s=0
Wn(f, s)
Wn(g, s)
P (s) =
n∑
s=0
αs1α
n−s
2
(
n
s
)
ps(1− p)n−s = (pα1 + (1− p)α2)n.
On the other hand, from the formula fKelly =

0, if p ∈ [0, p−]
(1−p)o12
o12−o11 +
po22
o22−o21 , if p ∈ [p−, p+]
1, if p ∈ [p+, 1],
we have for any pair
(f, fKelly), pα1 + (1− p)α2 = 1 if p ∈ [p−, p+] and pα1 + (1− p)α2 < 1 if p /∈ [p−, p+].
Proposition 3. We consider a game with payoff without extinction
Mn(f, g) := P(Wn(f)W0 > Wn(g)V0),
where W0, V0 have the same distribution. Then, in this game, (fKelly, fKelly) is a strict Nash equilibrium.
Proof. First, we note that
Mn(f, g) =
n∑
s=0
P(Wn(f, s)W0 > Wn(g, s)V0)P (s) =
n∑
s=0
P(αs1αn−s2 W0 > V0)P (s)
=
∑
s∈A1
P (s)
1
2
αs1α
n−s
2 +
∑
s∈A2
P (s)
(
1− 1
2
α−s1 α
−n+s
2
)
,
(9)
where A1 = {s ∈ {0, . . . , n} : αs1αn−s2 < 1} and A2 = {0, . . . , n} −A1. Therefore, for f = g we have α1 = α2 = 1,
which implies A1 = ∅, A2 = {0, . . . , n} and
Mn(f, f) =
n∑
s=0
P (s)
(
1− 1
2
)
= 1/2. (10)
For any f 6= fKelly, by using the Cauchy inequality for the second term, we have
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Mn(f, f
Kelly) <
∑
s∈A1
P (s)
1
2
αs1α
n−s
2 +
∑
s∈A2
P (s)
1
2
αs1α
n−s
2 =
1
2
(pα1 + (1− p)α2)n.
From Proposition 2 we have
Mn(f, f
Kelly) < 1/2 = Mn(f
Kelly, fKelly), ∀f 6= fKelly. (11)
Therefore (fKelly, fKelly) is a strict Nash equilibrium.
Proposition 4. The above Nash equilibrium is the unique one in the game.
Proof. Assume that (f0, g0) 6= (fKelly, fKelly) is another Nash equilibrium. Without loss of generality we assume
that g0 6= fKelly. By definition of a Nash equilibrium, we have Mn(f0, g0) ≥Mn(f, g0) for all f and Mn(g0, f0) ≥
Mn(g, f0) for all g. By choosing f = g = fKelly and using Propposition G we haveMn(f0, g0) ≥Mn(fKelly, g0) >
1
2
and Mn(g0, f0) ≥ Mn(fKelly, f0) ≥ 12 . This implies that Mn(f0, g0) + Mn(g0, f0) > 1 which is a contradiction
to Proposition 1. Therefore (fKelly, fKelly) is the unique Nash equilibrium (see Fig. I.1 where the equilibrium
lies at the saddle-point of the payoff landscape.)
Fig. I.1: A 3D graphical representation of a probability payoff matrix (Eq.(5))) with primary (blue) and opponent
(orange) lineage payoffs as intersecting saddle-point surfaces, highlighting the equilibrium locus.
Appendix J The symmetric Nash equilibrium solution to payoff
Mc(f, g)
Proposition 5. We consider a game with payoff defined as (6) without extinction
Mc(f, g) := P(T (f, c) < T (g, c)) + P(T (f, c) = T (g, c),W0WT (f,c)(f) > V0WT (g,c)(g)).
Then, in this game, (fKelly, fKelly) is a strict Nash equilibrium.
Proof. First we note that
Mc(f, g) =
∞∑
n=1
P(T (g, c) > n, T (f, c) = n) + P(T (g, c) = n,W0Wn(f) > V0Wn(g), T (f, c) = n)
=
∞∑
n=1
P(V0Wn(g) < c, T (f, c) = n) + P(V0Wn(g) ≥ c,W0Wn(f) > V0Wn(g), T (f, c) = n)
=
∞∑
n=1
P(W0Wn(f) > V0Wn(g), T (f, c) = n).
Then, from Propposition 3 we have
Mc(f, f) =
∞∑
n=1
P(W0 > V0, T (f, c) = n) = P(W0 > V0) =
1
2
∀f
and
Mc(f, f
Kelly) <
1
2
∞∑
n=1
P(T (f, c) = n) = 1
2
∀f.
Therefore (fKelly, fKelly) is a strict Nash equilibrium.
Proposition 6. (fKelly, fKelly) is the unique Nash equilibrium.
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Proof. We first note that for all f, g
Mc(f, g) +Mc(g, f) =
∞∑
n=1
(
P(W0Wn(f) > V0Wn(g) + P(W0Wn(f) < V0Wn(g)
)
, T (f, c) = n)
=
∞∑
n=1
P(T (f, c) = n) = 1.
The left hand side is similar to the proof in Propposition 4.
It is worthwhile here to highlight a link between the this payoff andMn(f, g). Formally, Mc(f, g) can be rewritten
as a convex linear combination of Mn(f, g):
Mc(f, g) =
∞∑
n=0
P (W0Wn(f) > V0Wn(g), T (f, c) = n).
This has a straightforward interpretation: for each event (T (f, c) = n), [a] the event (T (f, c) < T (g, c)) is equiva-
lent to the event (T (g, c) > n) or (V0Wn(g) < c <= W0Wn(f)), and [b] the event (T (f, c) = T (g, c),W0WT (f,c) >
V0WT (g,c)(g)) is equivalent to the event (c <= V0Wn(g) < W0Wn(f)). Consequently the combination of the
two events (T (f, c) < T (g, c)) and (T (f, c) = T (g, c),W0WT (f,c) > V0WT (g,c)(g)) is equivalent to the event
(W0Wn(f) > V0Wn(g)).
Appendix K The probability payoff matrix converges with hori-
zon n to the expected log matrix
Proposition 7. For any pair (f, g) with G(f) 6= G(g), we have
M∞(f, g) := lim
n→∞
Mn(f, g) =
{
1, if G(f) > G(g)
0, if G(f) < G(g).
Proof. If G(f) − G(g) = ε > 0, then by a similar argumentation as Appendix D, there exists n0 < ∞ such that
for all n ≥ n0 and all x
0 <
1
n
logW0 <
ε
4
, 0 <
1
n
log V0 <
ε
4
,
1
n
logWn(f,x) > G(f)− ε
4
,
1
n
logWn(g,x) < G(g) +
ε
4
.
Therefore, for all n ≥ n0 and all x
1
n
logW0 +
1
n
logWn(f,x)− 1
n
log V0 − 1
n
logWn(g,x) >
ε
4
> 0.
This implies that
Mn(f, g) = P
(
1
n
logW0 +
1
n
logWn(f) >
1
n
log V0 +
1
n
logWn(g)
)
= 1 for all n ≥ n0.
Therefore, M∞(f, g) = 1. Similarly we obtain M∞(f, g) = 0 if G(f) < G(g).
Remark 2. For the case G(f) = G(g) there are only two cases, g = f or g = fˆ . If g = f we have M∞(f, f) = 12 .
If g = fˆ we do not know the value of M∞(f, fˆ).
See Fig. K.1 for a graphical illustration of the convergence.
A B
Fig. K.1: A payoff matrix resulting from a very large time horizon n (for primary lineage). With increasing
horizon n values become highly contrasted with off-diagonal cells near 0 or 1 (excepting those corresponding
to strategies that result in equal asymptotic growth rates, here on the ridge perpendicular to the diagonal). |
B: A payoff matrix with entries based on pairwise differences in E[logW ], reflecting standard Kelly asymptotic
growth-optimality.
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Appendix L Nash equilibrium in population size N
In this section, we show that the Nash solution in population size N , denoted by f∗N , will be the strategy closest to
Kelly under the finite resolution regime, and such that it converges asymptotically with N to the Kelly strategy.
Denote by f∗N the closest element to fKelly in IN := {0, 1N , . . . , 1}, i.e., f∗N = arg minf∈IN |f − fKelly|. We show
that (f∗N , f∗N ) is the Nash solution for the game with strategies defined only on IN . Due to the definition of f∗N , we
see that |f∗N − fKelly| ≤ 1N → 0 as N →∞. To this end, we show that Mn(f∗N , f∗N ) ≥ Mn(f, f∗N ) for all f ∈ IN .
Indeed, we have already from (10) that Mn(f∗N , f∗N ) = 12 . Moreover, we have p log o1(f) + (1 − p) log o2(f) <
p log o1(f
∗
N ) + (1− p) log o2(f∗N ) for all f ∈ IN \ {f∗N}. Therefore there exists ε > 0 such that
p log
o1(f)
o1(f∗N )
+ (1− p) log o2(f)
o2(f∗N )
< −ε ∀f ∈ IN \ {f∗N}.
Thus, for every f ∈ IN \ {f∗N} we have
∑n
s=0 α(s)P (s) < −nε where α(s) := s log o1(f)o1(f∗N ) + (n− s) log
o2(f)
o2(f
∗
N
)
. We
assume that logW0 and log V0 have the same distribution with supp log W0 ⊃ {α(0), . . . , α(n)} and |supp log W0| =
|supp log V0| = r > 2nε. Denote by A1 = {s : α(s) < 0}, A2 = {s : α(s) ≥ 0} and δ =
1
2
−nε
r
3
4
−nε
r
∈ (0, 1
2
). We have
Mn(f, f
∗
N ) =
n∑
s=0
P(α(s) + logW0 > log V0)P (s) =
∑
s∈A1
1
2
(r + α(s))2
r2
P (s) +
∑
s∈A2
(
1−
1
2
(r − α(s))2
r2
)
P (s)
=
1
2
+
∑
s∈A1
α(s)
r
(
1 +
α(s)
2r
)
P (s) +
∑
s∈A2
α(s)
r
(
1− α(s)
2r
)
P (s)
=
1
2
+
∑
s∈A1
α(s)
r
(
δ +
α(s)
2r
)
P (s) +
∑
s∈A2
α(s)
r
(
δ − α(s)
2r
)
P (s) + (1− δ)
n∑
s=0
α(s)
r
P (s).
Note that α(s)
r
∈ [−1, 0] for s ∈ A1 and α(s)r ∈ [0, 1] for s ∈ A2. Moreover x(δ + x/2) ≤ 12 − δ < 12 − 34δ for
x ∈ [−1, 0]; x(δ − x/2) ≤ δ2
2
< 1
2
− 3
4
δ for x ∈ [−1, 0]. Therefore, for every f ∈ IN \ {f∗N} we have
Mn(f, f
∗
N ) <
1
2
+
(1
2
− 3
4
δ
) n∑
s=0
P (s) + (1− δ)
n∑
s=0
α(s)
r
P (s) <
1
2
+
(1
2
− 3
4
δ
)
+ (1− δ)−nε
r
=
1
2
.
Appendix M Nash equilibrium in nonstationary environments
Proposition 8. We consider also a game with payoff of players are
Mn(f, g) := P(Wn(f)W0 > Wn(g)V0),
whereW0, V0 have the same distribution. Then, in this game, (fKelly, fKelly) is the unique strict Nash equilibrium.
Proof. We note that in the non-stationary case we have
Mn(f, g) =
n∑
H=0
P(αH1 αn−H2 W0 > V0)P (H),
where H ∼ GB(n, {p1, . . . , pn} ∼ Beta(α, β)) is a generalized binomial distribution. Therefore the proof is similar
to the proof in Proposition 3 and is omitted.
Appendix N Limit of the extinction rate
Proposition 9. Denote by
Qn,d(f) := P(W0W1(f) > d, . . . ,W0Wn(f) > d).
the probability that the extinction does not occur until time n and Pn,d(f) = 1−Qn,d(f) the probability of extinction
until time n (also see Fig. 6). We prove that
lim
n→∞
Pn,d(f) =
0, if o1(f), o2(f) > 11, if o1(f), o2(f) < 1
cd(f) ∈ [0, 1], else.
Proof. For the sake of simplicity, we denote by
βn,d(x1, . . . , xn) :=
d
o1(f)x1o2(f)1−x1
∨ · · · ∨ d
o1(f)x1+···+xno2(f)n−x1−···−xn
.
Then we rewrite the formula
Qn,d(f) =
∑
x1,...,xn
P (x1, . . . , xn)P
(
W0 > βn,d(x1, . . . , xn)
)
.
(i) If o1(f), o2(f) > 1: we have βn,d(x1, . . . , xn−1, 1) = βn,d(x1, . . . , xn−1, 0) = βn−1,d(x1, . . . , xn−1), therefore
Qn,d(f) = Qn−1,d(f) = · · · = Q0,d = P(W0 > d) = 1 for all n. Therefore limn→∞ Pn,d(f) = 0.
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(ii) If o1(f), o2(f) < 1: we have βn,d(x1, . . . , xn) = do1(f)x1+···+xno2(f)n−x1−···−xn which approaches infinity with
n. Therefore for n large enough, Qn,d = 0. This implies limn→∞ Pn,d(f) = 1.
(iii) If o1(f) > 1 > o2(f): we have βn,d(x1, . . . , xn−1, 1) = βn−1,d(x1, . . . , xn−1). Note that Qn,d is decreasing
and bounded below by 0, therefore there exists the limit of Qn,d(f) which implies the limit of Pn,d(f).
Remark 3. cd(f) is increasing with d (see Fig. 6).
Proof. If d1 > d2 then βn,d1(x1, . . . , xn) > βn,d2(x1, . . . , xn) therefore Qn,d1(f) < Qn,d2(f) which implies that
cd1(f) ≥ cd2(f).
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